In the very few cases in recent years, some employees have deliberately delayed signing a written labor contract, or deliberately submitted a written labor contract with false signatures, and then demanded 'double wages' from the employer through public relief. Thus, labor arbitration, civil trials, and criminal trials have made a two-level evaluation on civil legitimacy and criminal offenses. Such a dual-evaluation implies a risk of the rule of law. As a punitive damages created by the Labor Contract Law, "double wages" is a means to implement a written contract system, but its major premise is vague in terms of language. In judicial practice, the imputation and proof rules for the "double wages" are also vague. Moreover, "double wages" does not presuppose that the worker suffers actual damage, so if the worker does not cooperate with the contract, the employer's countermeasures are relatively limited. Therefore, the necessity and balance of the "double wages" need to be examined. As the punitive damages has the function of rewarding litigation, the labor fi eld, differing from the consumer fi eld, is not suitable for the value orientation of rewarding litigation. In judicial practice, the study believes that the punitive damage usually prevents laborers' abuse or malicious litigation from the subject level, but there are also undesirable points. In the future, the "double wages" rule could be deleted, revised, and restricted from the legislative and judicial levels according to actual conditions